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Abstract 
 The article analyzes the scientific approaches of scientists regarding evolution, the essence 
and features of the concepts of responsibility, social responsibility, legal responsibility. It is stated 
that responsibility is determined by the level of development of public consciousness, the level of 
social relations, and existing social institutions. Responsibility as a social phenomenon can manifest 
itself in a positive way by receiving remuneration, and in a negative way as a reflection for commit-
ting offenses. The classification of responsibility as a social phenomenon depends on the sphere of 
social activity, in connection with which political, moral, social, legal and other types of responsibil-
ity are distinguished. 
It is theoretically substantiated that legal responsibility differs from other types of social re-
sponsibility in formal certainty, mandatory observance of legal norms, state control over their im-
plementation, application of state coercion to the offender, prevention of offenses and the protection 
of law and order. The measure of responsibility in public and private legal relations has been deter-
mined. 
In this study public tort (crime and misconduct) is analyzed, problematic issues are outlined 
and proposals for their improvement are provided. The types of legal responsibility for committing 
offenses (tort) are considered. Attention is focused on the fact that responsibility is a prerequisite for 
the development and effective functioning of the state, its effectiveness depends on the mechanisms 
for implementing responsibility in front of the person and is determined by the level of development 
of public consciousness, the level of social relations, existing social institutions. The key task of re-
sponsibility is fair application and inevitability of punishment. 
Keywords: responsibility, legal responsibility, classification, offense, sanction, punishment, 
justice, legal norms. 
 
Introduction 
A necessary condition for the development and effective functioning of a socially oriented 
market economy, ensuring a high quality of life for the population, creating a civil society and ex-
panding conditions for human development is the formation and implementation of legal institu-
tions, including the institution of legal responsibility. 
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The development of democracy without responsibility is impossible, democracy without re-
sponsibility turns into permissiveness, which we see in post-Soviet countries everywhere, at all le-
vels from the personal to the state itself. Democracy and responsibility are two sides of a single 
whole. Democracy is necessary in the society, while responsibility is important in the state, democ-
racy is a necessary part of the team, as well as responsibility plays an important role in the organiza-
tion (Grishnova, 2011). 
 
Materials and Methods 
This article analyzes the works of classical and modern scholars who consider legal respon-
sibility as a social phenomenon and the greatest humanitarian value. Also, the regulatory framework 
was analyzed, providing for legal responsibility in different branches of law. Thus, the materials of 
the article are both the works of the scientific general philosophical and legal doctrine, and the cur-
rent regulatory legal acts. 
The main methods used in the research are such general scientific and special legal methods 
as analysis and synthesis; deduction and induction; search for information; systemic-structural, for-
mal-legal and dogmatic. 
The social and legal nature of responsibility was investigated by representatives of both the 
branch of law and other areas, among which were such as V.B. Averyanov (Averyanov et al., 2007), 
Yu.V. Alexandrov (Alexandrov et al., 2004), Yu. P. Bytyak (Bytyak et al., 2007), V. K. Kolpakov 
(Kolpakov, 2016), V.V. Kopeychikov (Kopeychikov, 2003) and others. However, the problem of 
responsibility is one of the important issues of our time, which now causes many discussions among 
scientists. That is why the purpose of the article is to analyze the essence of responsibility as a social 
phenomenon, the genesis of its development, to clarify the role of the legal institution of legal re-
sponsibility in public and private legal relations, to define the problem of responsibility for commit-
ting torts and to provide proposals for improving logical structures in the form of definitions and 
norms. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Responsibility as a social phenomenon arose along with the emergence of humanity and so-
ciety, with the emergence of a system of normative regulation of social relations, the emergence of 
norms, customs, religious norms, morality and law. It is responsibility, rightly noted by B.S. Yakov-
lev, is a factor regulating human behavior throughout history, as well as one of the factors control-
ling human behavior (Yakovlev, 1978). "This is a definite phenomenon that exists independently of 
any subjective factors ... is a mandatory manifestation of the regulation of social relations within the 
limits of the correspondence of personal behavior between the subjects of social communication" 
(Grishchuk, 2012). That is, responsibility is objectively determined by the needs of society and is a 
mandatory manifestation of the regulation of social relations in society. 
First, let's define the essence and content of the concept of responsibility. If we turn to lin-
guistics, then the definition of "responsibility" is interpreted as: assigned to someone or assumed 
responsibility to be responsible for a certain area of work, business, for someone's actions, deeds, 
words (Busel, 2005); the need, the obligation to be responsible for their actions, deeds, to be respon-
sible for them (Ozhegov, 1984). In the philosophical dictionary of M.M. Rosenthal: “Responsibility 
is a category of ethics and law, reflecting the special social and moral-legal attitude of the individual 
to society (humanity as a whole), characterized by the observance of the norms of law and morality” 
(Rosenthal, 1975). 
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Responsibility is a legal and state-administrative category that reflects the value-legal aspect 
of social relations, which are built on the principle of "person – society – state". “The actualization 
of the idea of a welfare state shifts the emphasis of both scientific research and political practice on 
the social responsibility of a person before society and the state to the social responsibility of the 
state before society and a person” (Shvets, 2012). 
Thinking about responsibility as a means of ensuring the rights of citizens, it should be noted 
that it arose in the days of primitive society and had an exclusively social nature. It was used as a 
means of punishing community members who in their behavior deviated from generally accepted 
rules, norms and customs. 
As for responsibility as a social phenomenon, this is a rather specific form of the relationship 
between the individual and society, which ensures the elimination of inconsistency, disorganization 
in public life, resolution of contradictions and conflicts between participants in social relations, and 
therefore arises when there is a need to coordinate human behavior with a system of social require-
ments (norms, rules). 
Making an excursion into history, we note that one of the first definitions "responsible" and 
"responsibility" was used by I. Kant. He does not define the state as the real instance of responsibili-
ty, but the basis of the absolute moral law, which is embodied in the human conscience. But realiz-
ing that “the best controller - conscience - cannot always guarantee the observance of the principle 
of responsibility, Kant introduces into the system of values the absolute moral law of awareness of 
punishment for its violation (Weber, 1990). The ancient Greek statesman and philosopher Solon also 
noted the need to unite power and law, to carry out transformations in the state on the basis of an 
exclusively legal official and universal law. And it was precisely behind the legislative reforms of 
Solon, according to Aristotle, that Athenian democracy began (Nersesyants, 2002). Plato and Aris-
totle tried to explain the reason for this, and not another human act, considering the relationship be-
tween voluntary and forced, conscious and unconscious, objective and subjective, free and neces-
sary. The responsibility of a person for his choice, as a result of freedom of choice, is obvious to 
Plato. In his writings, Plato presents the double nature of responsibility – moral responsibility and 
responsibility before the law, which is transformed into responsibility for its violation. Based on this 
theory, there are two aspects – positive (moral responsibility to society, the state) and negative (re-
sponsibility that a person experiences in violation of established norms) (Okhrimenko, 2015). For 
example, the Timaeus (treatise) describes how Er entered the kingdom of the dead, where he saw 
how people chose their own destiny. They are free in their choice and are responsible for this, since 
their choice determines their entire further path (Plato, 2002) . In the doctrine of Heraclitus about the 
Logos, the main ethical problem is posed - the relationship between how real people behave and 
how they should behave (Dynnik, 1955). That is, the teaching of Heraclitus shows the possibility of 
a person's choice of behavior, and therefore it is he who is responsible for the results of this choice. 
In ancient Rome, according to Polybius, responsibility was provided by the distribution of 
power between the three branches of government: the consuls, the senate and the people. The system 
of control and responsibility of the authorities, established in Rome, made it possible "... to control 
one branch of government by another, when possible claims of one government for inappropriate 
value meet with the corresponding opposition of other authorities, and the state as a whole retains its 
stability and strength" (Hobbes, 1991). It is worth paying attention to the fact that as soon as the sys-
tem of social responsibility of Ancient Rome was broken over time, this led to the weakening and 
further destruction of the Roman Empire. 
Thus, the emergence of responsibility as a social phenomenon is possible subject to the pre-
liminary presentation of certain requirements for the behavior of people, enshrined in social norms. 
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Responsibility itself is determined by the level of development of social consciousness, the level of 
social relations, and existing social institutions. 
The classification of responsibility as a social phenomenon depends on the sphere of social 
activity, in connection with which political, moral, social, legal and other types of responsibility are 
distinguished. Social responsibility and legal responsibility are related to each other as genus and 
species. So they are considered not only by the general theory of law, but also by all branch legal 
sciences. 
Political responsibility is awareness of the need to fulfill the requirements arising from polit-
ical norms, as well as conviction for their failure to fulfill or improper fulfillment, for incompetence 
or vested interests. The activities of political parties, government bodies, local governments, their 
officials provide for their political responsibility to the social communities whose interests they ex-
press. Note that often moral responsibility and the means to ensure it are even no less effective than 
it is in the law (Bernstein, 1989). 
From a psychological point of view, responsibility is a person's ability to adhere to social 
norms. The structure of responsibility as a sociological category was examined in detail by the Rus-
sian scientist M.A. Krasnov, who determined that it concentratedly includes the freedom of choice 
of a variant of behavior by the subject of responsibility, who has free will; establishing a model of 
appropriate, expected behavior or, conversely, inappropriate behavior; a causal relationship between 
behavior and its consequences; instance of responsibility; monitoring and evaluating behavior; the 
possibility of adverse consequences for the responsible entity found guilty (Krasnov, 1995). 
In philosophy, it is generally accepted that the responsibility of the subject of social relations 
can be judged by finding out the relationship between the necessity and freedom of his behavior 
(Kosolapov, 1969). Responsibility does not matter if the person is not free in choosing his behavior 
or does not understand it, because “Will gives rise to responsibility, responsibility directs the will” 
(Leist, 1962). 
When discussing the problems of responsibility, we can often find ourselves in the sphere of 
interests of such a sphere of science and social interaction as law. It is not surprising, firstly, the 
theoretical foundations of law are largely formed by ethics and social philosophy, an integral part of 
which we see the concept of responsibility in general and social responsibility in particular. And se-
condly, one of the basic postulates of law is the principle of equality of all members of society (in 
the case of legal regulation of social processes, this principle takes the form of equality of all mem-
bers of society before the law). Any significant injustice in society can be the result of an offense 
(Radugin, 2003). 
One of the main institutions of law is the institution of legal responsibility. Legal responsibil-
ity differs from other types of social responsibility in formal certainty, mandatory observance of le-
gal norms, state control over their implementation, application of state coercion to the offender, pre-
vention of offenses and the protection of law and order. 
It should be noted that now in the science of law there is no single definition of legal respon-
sibility. Some scientists (R. Engabaryan, Yu.K. Krasnov, M.I. Matuzov, O.F. Skakun, B. Ya. Toka-
rev) believe that legal responsibility comes down to the implementation of sanctions of the rule of 
law, that is, measures of legal coercion (Stolyarov, 1996), according to L. S. Yavich, legal responsi-
bility is the application of the sanction of the violated law (Yavich, 1976), M.I. Matuzov and 
A.V. Malka note that this is one of the types of social responsibility of the individual, the key feature 
of which is that it is associated with the violation of legal norms, which is the apparatus of state 
coercion (Matuzov et al., 2015). 
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One of the functions of the state is the protection of the rights of citizens and the protection 
of the state structure. That is, the state protects with the help of legal instruments both public and 
private interests. We are impressed by the scientific position of F.V. Taranovsky, who divides legal 
relations into public and private, depending on the participation of carriers of coercive state power, 
in particular, according to the lawyer, legal relations are public if one of the subjects is the state 
(through its bodies) with the specific character of the carrier of coercive power. In private relations, 
the state does not participate as a subject or acts as a participant in legal relations only as a bearer of 
property interests (Taranovsky, 2001). These legal relations are a classic type of public law rela-
tions, their feature is that they, as a rule, have a vertical orientation and are subordinate, since the 
subjects of public authority occupy a clearly defined place in the hierarchy of the state mechanism 
and have a certain range of powers. In the process of legal relations, subjects exercise their rights, 
exercise powers, perform functions and implement the tasks assigned to them by law. 
Legal liability in private legal relations occurs for violation of the contract and is expressed 
in the form of material sanctions: forced debt collection, imposition of a fine, and the like. Only a 
person who is legally capable in accordance with the norms of the law can carry out legally impor-
tant actions and, accordingly, be liable for their commission. When it comes to legal responsibility 
in private legal relations, the key is the concept of a person's legal capacity. When it comes to legal 
responsibility for the commission of an offense, it seems more correct to use the term delinquency. 
Legal responsibility in public law relations occurs only for the commission of tort. In Roman 
law, a tort (offense) meant the commission of an act that violated a legal order or prohibition, as a 
result of which harm was caused to another person, his family or property. The consequence of the 
commission of a tort was liability, which arose under the following conditions: the delinquency of 
the offender, guilt, the commission of an offense (Petkov, 2011). The generally accepted paradigm 
is a scientifically grounded and practice-proven approach that public tort - offenses according to the 
social significance of the committed unlawful act are divided into crimes (socially dangerous, guilty 
act (action or inaction) committed by the subject of the crime - Article 11 of the Criminal Code of 
Ukraine) (Criminal Code of Ukraine, 2001) and misconduct (unlawful, guilty (intentional or negli-
gent) action or inaction that infringes on public order, property, rights and freedoms of citizens, on 
the established management procedure – Article 9 of the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Of-
fenses) (Petkov, 2020). 
It should be emphasized that both the corpus delicti and the corpus delicti can be established 
only by law. It is erroneous to believe that the composition of misconduct can be established by sec-
ondary legislation. Also, it should not be allowed that the norms of the law establishing responsibili-
ty were of a blanket (reference) nature to any rules or instructions and the like. 
Both a crime and a misdemeanor can be committed by a person during activities in any field 
and in particular, in management – administrative. But all misconduct is in fact a violation of discip-
linary rules, a minor deviation from generally accepted norms of behavior. And crimes are a manife-
station of a person's gross rejection of the foundations of society. Note that in the first case, the per-
son bears disciplinary responsibility in the form of a penalty, and in the second – criminal responsi-
bility in the form of punishment. 
The main mistake of domestic science was that this division of torts (offenses) according to 
the degree of public danger was put on a par with other classifications, which led to some confusion. 
Therefore, it is now urgent to clearly distinguish between crimes and misdemeanors, to prevent mix-
ing these concepts in one normative act regulating punishment for these different, diametrically op-
posite actions (Petkov et al., 2020). 
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The behavior of the subjects of state and power powers is determined by the norms of legis-
lation, which are of an imperative nature. The duty to exercise the rights is characteristic of most 
public rights, while the private person does not have such a duty. For example, a person appointed to 
the position of a professional judge and endowed by the Constitution and the Law of Ukraine "On 
the Judicial System and the Status of Judges" with the right to administer justice is obliged to exer-
cise his rights in good faith, and cannot use them solely at his own discretion or of his own free will. 
With regard to private-legal relations, a person is an independent manager of his rights and is free to 
resolve issues of using the rights granted to him by law. The division of legal relations into public 
and private is a paradigm proved by Roman lawyers. 
The types of legal liability are criminal liability (conviction on behalf of the state by a court 
verdict of a person who committed a crime, and the application of compulsory, in the form of pu-
nishment or other measures of criminal liability provided for by the Criminal Code of Ukraine. and 
its establishment by a guilty verdict. That is, criminal liability takes the form of its real existence 
after a person has been convicted by a court for a committed act and a conviction) and disciplinary 
liability (the employee's obligation to answer to the employer for a disciplinary offense committed 
by him and to incur disciplinary penalties provided for by the labor law) ... The main task of crimi-
nal responsibility is to punish the offender and prevent further offenses, while the key task of discip-
linary responsibility is to educate the person who committed the offense and prevent further of-
fenses. 
According to M.I. Korzhansky, it is very relevant now “... large-scale decriminalization of 
Ukrainian legislation and it is in the context of these two paradigms that the issue of amendments to 
the legislation should be considered, especially in that part of it that concerns legal responsibility. 
The essence of the departure from the Soviet model is not at all in the transfer (transfer) of norms 
from the KUoAO to the Criminal Code of Ukraine, but, on the contrary, in reducing the punitive and 
administrative influence of the state. From punitive to human rights! - the essence of the human-
centered approach in criminal law. From administrative pressure in public service functions! – the 
essence of the person-centered approach in administrative law. And at the same time, the theory of 
law is the foundation for the innovative development of the law of Ukraine, embodied in legislation” 
(Korzhansky, 1999). 
The Constitution of Ukraine states that a person can only be held liable for offenses that are 
defined in the legislation. The law must be clear and effective. The punishment is just and inevitable 
(Constitution of Ukraine, 1996). At the same time, a law will be effective only when all the compo-
nents of a legal norm are present in it: a hypothesis as a rule of behavior; disposition – violation of 
this rule; sanction – punishment for violation (Petkov et al., 2020). 
 
Conclusions 
Thus, responsibility as a social phenomenon is a necessary condition for the development 
and effective functioning of the state, its effectiveness depends on the mechanisms for implementing 
responsibility in front of the person and is determined by the level of development of public con-
sciousness, the level of social relations, and existing social institutions. 
Today, the theoretically unjustified novelization of the legislation on responsibility for an of-
fense has become a real threat to national security. The chaotic, unsystematic heap of blanket norms 
in the basic codes, the introduction of new definitions and definitions into the legislation on criminal 
liability, a lack of understanding of the essence of disciplinary liability for misconduct, the creation 
of new bodies carrying out administrative activities that are carried out in the sphere of functioning 
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of other state bodies, have led to real irresponsibility of officials. persons of public authorities and 
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